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A HIGHER STRUCTURE IDENTITY PRINCIPLE
DIMITRIS TSEMENTZIS
Abstract. We prove a Structure Identity Principle for theories defined on types
of h-level 3 by defining a general notion of saturation for a large class of structures
definable in the Univalent Foundations.
Formalizing mathematics in the framework of the Univalent Foundations [Uni13]
presents unique challenges and opportunities. One of the main opportunities is the
ability to formalize higher-level mathematics (categories, higher categories etc.) in
an invariant way by imposing appropriate saturation conditions. This is done, for
example, in [Uni13] for category theory (cf. Definition 9.1.6). An interesting challenge
is how to express general saturation conditions that apply to wide classes of structures
that can be formalized in UF. The main contribution of this paper is to provide such a
general definition of a saturation condition for a wide class of definable structures and
to use it to prove a Structure Identity Principle for all “category-level” (or “3-level”)
such structures.
To illustrate, consider the following theorem from [Uni13]:
Theorem 0.1 ([Uni13], Theorem 9.4.16). For any univalent categories C and D, the
type of categorical equivalences C ≃cat D is equivalent to C =UniCat D.
By regarding univalent categories as a “saturated” version of an unsaturated structure
(i.e. of precategories) we can regard the above result as a specific instance of a more
general result of the following form:
Pre-Theorem 0.2. For any saturated models M and N of an L-theory T, the type
of L-equivalences M≃L N is equivalent to M =SatMod
T
N .
The purpose of this paper is to make precise and prove a result of this form, such
that Theorem 9.4.16 follows as a special case (as an assurance of adequacy).
This is done as follows. An “L-theory T” will be given by a theory over a FOLDS
signature L in the sense of Makkai [Mak95], i.e. a finite inverse category L. A
“model M” of T (or just simply an “L-structure”) will be given by an interpretation
of FOLDS into HoTT as has been described in [Tse16]. An “L-equivalence” between
two such modelsM and N will be given by Makkai’s notion of FOLDS L-equivalence,
which in set theory is defined as the existence of a span of fiberwise surjective L-
homomorphisms fromM to N . What remains is to define what a “saturated” model
is in this setting and indeed this is the main contribution of this paper.
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The general definition of saturation is based on the following intuitive idea: a
structure is saturated if any two indistinguishable components in it are identical. To
make this idea precise we will define for any FOLDS signature L a general notion
of isomorphism for any sort K in L and any x, y : K in the form of an L-formula
x ∼= y. The intuition behind x ∼= y is that “x and y are indistinguishable by any
sort which depends on K, in any position”. Spelling out exactly how “indistinguish-
able” and “position” are to be formalized constitutes the main task of the syntactic
portion of the paper. Roughly, this is done by a mutually inductive definition of a
formula Ind(x, y) expressing indistinguishability (up to equivalence) with respect to
sorts “upstairs” (Definition 2.5) and then a notion of equivalence which says that
the indistinguishability relation Ind(x, y) is a bijection (up to indistinguishability)
(Definition 2.10).
We can then interpret the formula x ∼= y for any L-structure M and given this
we can define what it means for such an M to be saturated at any sort K and also
associated notions of total saturation, saturation at a given level etc. This forms
the key definition of this paper (Definition 3.2) which provides a very wide notion
of saturation of which the known examples of saturated structures become special
instances. For example, we will show that the totally saturated models of the theory
of categories are the univalent categories (Proposition 4.13) whereas precategories are
the “2-saturated” such models (Proposition 4.10).
Finally, given this general notion of saturation, we will prove a precise version of
Pre-Theorem 0.2 for FOLDS signatures L of “height” 3. Signatures of this height can
be thought of as expressing theories whose saturated models are given by structures
on 1-types, i.e. on types of h-level 3. The theory of precategories is an example of
such a theory. This is done in Theorem 4.9, the main result of this paper, which can
be thought of as a Structure Identity Principle for structures of h-level 3.
Outline of the Paper. In Section 1 we fix notation and introduce the relevant
concepts from FOLDS. In Section 2 we give the definition of x ∼= y for any FOLDS
signature L and any x, y : K (Definitions 2.5 and 2.10). In Section 3 we define sat-
uration for FOLDS L-structures in type theory (Definition 3.2) and prove certain
useful properties of our definitions. Finally, in Section 4 we internalize the notion
of FOLDS equivalence in type theory and use this definition to prove a Structure
Identity Principle for 3-level structures (Theorem 4.9). We also provide proofs that
our higher Structure Identity Principle gives the right answer in the case of the theory
of categories (Propositions 4.10 and 4.13).
1. Preliminaries and Notation
1.1. FOLDS. By FOLDS we understand the system of Makkai introduced in [Mak95].
We here introduce the relevant concepts. A FOLDS signature L is a finite inverse cat-
egory. We assume each signature L comes with a level function l : obL → N defined
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as follows
l(K) =


1 if K is the codomain only of 1K
sup
f : Kf→K
l(Kf ) + 1 otherwise
Note that “top-level” sorts are assigned level 1, contrary to Makkai’s original defini-
tion. This is done to foreshadow that these sorts, when saturated, will be interpreted
as types of h-level 1. However, we will write K > K ′ to denote that K has a lower
level than K ′ (i.e. that l(K) < l(K ′) in order to think of K > K ′ as saying that K
is “higher” (and therefore depends on) K ′. We also write h(L) for the height of L,
i.e. the maximum level of any sort K in L (since we are assuming that L is finite,
the height will also always be finite). For any K ∈ obL we will write L ↓ K for the
comma category under K in L. We will generally use the notation L(K,K ′) for the
hom-sets of L.
Variables for L are given by a functor V : L → Set satisfying certain obvious
conditions, e.g. that for any K 6= K ′, V (K) and V (K ′) are countably infinite disjoint
sets etc. We will write x : K for x ∈ V (K), for any K ∈ obL. For any x : K and
f ∈ L(K,Kf) we write xf for V (f)(x). It is helpful to think of f as a position and
xf as the variable that x depends on in position f . We write dep(x) for the set
{xf | dom(f) = K}, i.e. the set of dependent variables of x and ∂x for the the set of
dependent variables of x but omitting x, i.e the boundary of x.
A context is a finite subfunctor of V . A context morphism is a natural transfor-
mation s : Γ → ∆. For any two contexts Γ and ∆ we write Γ ∪∆ for their union as
subobjects of V , i.e. the functor that takes K 7→ Γ(K) ∪∆(K). It is not hard to see
that both dep(x) and ∂x define contexts. We will use the symbol = for equality of
contexts and variables.
We define the syntax associated to L by an inductive definition in the usual way
(except the clauses for quantifiers are a little more involved that first-order logic) and
we write FormL(Γ) for the set of L-formulas in context Γ. We write FV(φ) for the free
variables of an L-formula φ. Substitution along a context morphism is defined in the
expected way and we write s(φ) for the result of substituting the variables in a formula
φ in context Γ along s : Γ→ ∆. As usual, we consider formulas up to α-equivalence,
denoted by ≡α, i.e. up to renaming of their bound variables. A theory T in L is a set
of L-sentences. It is also useful (for the sake of Definition 2.5) to define the coarser
notion of contextual equivalence of formulas φ (in context Γ) and ψ (in context ∆),
denoted ∼c, as follows: φ ∼c ψ iff there exists an isomorphism s : Γ → ∆ such that
s(φ) ≡α ψ. In other words, two formulas are contextually equivalent if we can rename
the free variables of one in such a way as to make it α-equivalent to the other. This
notion is helpful in distinguishing repeat uses of the same variable in formulas, e.g.
φ(x, x) is not contextually equivalent to φ(x, y) but φ(x, y) is contextually equivalent
to φ(z, w).
For R ∈ obL with l(R) = 1 and α : R we write R(α) as syntactic sugar for the
formula ∃α : R.⊤. This means that FV(R(α)) = ∂α which means that if ∂α = ∂β
then R(α) ≡α R(β).
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For a set of variables Γ (not necessarily a context) we write ∀Γφ for the universal
closure of φ under all variables in Γ. When this is done we will assume that ∀Γφ is
well-formed, i.e. that FV(∀Γφ) is a well-formed context. For a given set of formulas
S, by
∧
S we will mean the conjunction of all formulas in S (and similarly for S1∧S2).
We will also reserve the symbol ⇔ for logical equivalence over a standard deductive
system for FOLDS (cf. [Mak95] for details). Alternatively, for the purposes of this
paper one may take the logical consequence relation⇒ to mean simply derivability in
the type-theoretic semantics of FOLDS formulas (cf. [Tse16] for a detailed explanation
of these semantics). For example without any loss of content one may simply take
something like φ⇒ ψ to mean that given a term of the interpretation of the formula
φ as a type one can produce a term of the type ψ in type theory. We will write
T |= φ⇔ ψ to denote T-provable logical equivalence of φ and ψ.
Several examples of FOLDS signatures will come in handy for the purpose of illus-
tration, so we define them here, with the level of each sort displayed on the left. We
will denote by Lrg the FOLDS signature
1 I
i

2 A
d



c

3 O
subject to the relation di = ci. Lrg can be thought of as a signature useful for
formalizing reflexive graphs.
By L=Arg we will denote the FOLDS signature extending Lrg where we add an
“equality” on A
1 I
i

=A
s
ww
t

2 A
d



c

3 O
subject to the relations di = ci, ds = dt, cs = ct.
By Lcat we will denote the following FOLDS signature
1 ◦
t0

t1 ❃
❃
❃
❃
❃
❃
❃
❃
t2 00
I
i

=A
t
 s
ww
2 A
c

d



3 O
subject to the same relations as L=Arg in addition to the following:
dt0 = dt2, ct1 = ct2, dt1 = ct0
A HIGHER STRUCTURE IDENTITY PRINCIPLE 5
ds = dt, cs = ct
By Tcat we will denote the Lcat-theory of categories axiomatized in the usual way, i.e.
by adding axioms expressing that ◦ is an associative operation for which I picks out
a right and left unit etc. (cf. [Tse16] for details).
1.2. Homotopy Type Theory. On the semantic side, we will assume that we will
work with some Homotopy Type Theory to which we will refer generically as type
theory. The system in [Uni13] will do just fine, for example. In particular, we will
assume that all the types in terms of which L-structures are defined live in some uni-
valent universe U . The terms proposition, set, n-type, h-level, precategory, univalent
category etc. refer to the standard definitions as given e.g. in [Uni13]. We will denote
by PreCat the type of precategories and by UniCat the type of univalent categories.
For a given type A and a, b : A we will write a =A b for the identity type of a and b,
often abbreviating to a = b when A is clear from the context. For a given f : A→ B
we will also use the abbreviation bij(f) for the type(
Π
x,x′ : A
f(x) = f(x′)→ x = x′
)
×
(
Π
y : B
Σ
x : A
f(x) = y
)
We use the notation ||A||n for the n-truncation of a type A, where n will denote the
h-level, e.g. for n = 1, ||A||1 is the propositional truncation.
Any FOLDS signature L can be translated as data in type theory in a straightfor-
ward way, giving us a notion of a type StrL of L-structures a term M of which can
be thought of as an L-structure (cf. [Tse16] for details). This is done by extracting a
Σ-type from L by induction on the level of L. For example, we have
StrucLrg =df Σ
O : U
Σ
A : O→O→U
Π
x : O
A(x, x)→ U
Whenever we pick a specific L-structure M : StrucL we will denote by KM the
interpretation of any sort K ∈ obL. For example, the data of M : StrucLrg can be
written as 〈OM, AM, IM〉. To further illustrate the notation, we can for instance
define
StrucL=Arg =df ΣM : StrucLrg
(
Π
x,y : OM
AM(x, y)×AM(x, y)→ U
)
Similarly, all L-formulas can be translated under the usual propositions-as-types
translation of the quantifiers and logical connectives (with ∃ interpreted as truncated
Σ and ∨ interpreted as truncated + ensuring that the interpretations are all h-props).
For example, for the Lrg-sentence ∃x : O.∀f : A(x, x).I(f) will be interpreted in an
L-structure M as the proposition
|| Σ
x : OM
Π
f : AM(x,x)
IM(f)||1
When necessary we will write φM to refer to the interpretation of a certain L-formula
into an L-structure M. We can then obtain a notion of satisfaction of a formula
φ in an L-structure M and therefore a notion of a model M of an L-theory T
(where a theory T is a set of L-sentences). We write ModT for the type of T-
models, i.e. those L-structures that satisfy all φ ∈ T. For example, for the Lrg-theory
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T1 = {∃x : O.∀f : A(x, x).I(f)} we have
ModT1 =df Σ
M : StrucL
|| Σ
x : OM
Π
f : AM(x,x)
IM(f)||1
Finally, note that a well-formed context Γ in the sense of FOLDS clearly gives rise to
a well-formed context ΓM in type theory, and so we will freely use the notation ΓM
to denote the interpretation of Γ in some L-structure M.
1.3. Note on Metatheory. Throughout this paper we work in a set-theoretic meta-
theory. This should already be clear by our use of e.g. the symbol ∈ in our definition of
a FOLDS signature and its associated notions. However, we aim for this set-theoretic
metatheory to be “foundation-agnostic” in that our definitions and arguments could
equally well be formalized within an extensional set theory like ZF or a suitable model
of a structural set theory inside the Univalent Foundations.
One further clarification is in order, to avoid any confusion. Since our metalanguage
is set-theoretic we will often refer to expressions in type theory using set-theoretic
abbreviations. For example, the symbol
×
s∈S
Rs
might refer to a well-formed type in type theory (a non-dependent sum with S-many
components) but is not itself to be understood as a well-formed type in type theory.
Rather, it is a description of such a type in our set-theoretic metalanguage (hence the
use of “∈” under ×). Similarly, in Section 2 below we will construct set-theoretically
certain FOLDS formulas which we then use to describe certain well-formed types
in type theory. But our FOLDS formulas, as constructed, are not themselves to
be understood as constructed inside type theory. In particular, our description of
the relevant formulas will contain certain distinctions between variables that will be
internally invisible to the type theory.
2. A Syntactic Definition of Isomorphism
Fix a FOLDS signature L. Let x : K for some K ∈ obL. Then we define the set of
x-compatible sorts as follows:
Lx =df {R ∈ obL|R > K and ∀q ∈ L(R,K)∀p1, p2 ∈ L(K,K
′), p1q = p2q ⇒ xp1 = xp2}
If R ∈ Lx we say that x is R-compatible. The idea is that a certain variable is not
R-compatible if its dependent variables violate some identity that R requires in order
to be defined. The following example illustrates this.
Example 2.1. In Lrg a variable f : A with fd = x and fc = y (and where x 6= y) is
not I-compatible. This is because di = ci yet fc 6= fd as just stated. However, in L=Arg
f is =A-compatible (since =A does not “require” an identification between “source”
and “target”).
Remark 2.2. If ∂x = ∂y then Lx = Ly. In other words, variables with the same
boundary are compatible with exactly the same sorts.
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The idea of the syntactic definition of isomorphism for K goes as follows. For any
variables x, y : K we will define by mutual induction a formula
Ind(x, y) ∈ FormL(dep(x) ∪ dep(y))
that expresses the fact that x and y are “indistinguishable up to equivalence” by any
of the sorts they are jointly compatible with (i.e. for all R ∈ Lx ∩ Ly) and where
“equivalence” will be defined, for any α, β : A, as a formula
A(α) ≃ A(β) ∈ FormL(∂α ∪ ∂β)
Our first goal is to define these formulas (by mutual induction).
We begin with the definition of indistinguishability, i.e. of the formula Ind(x, y).
Let x, y : K and R ∈ Lx ∩ Ly and p ∈ L(R,K). Then we have the following two
definitions expressing respectively “x and y cannot be distinguished by R in position
p, up to equivalence” and “x and y cannot be distinguished by R in any position, up
to equivalence”:
IndpR(x, y) =df
∧
{∀Γα,βR(α) ≃ R(β) | α, β : R,αp = x, βp = y, ∀p 6= q ∈ L(R,K).αq = βq,
Γα,β = ∂α ∪ ∂β \ (dep(αp) ∪ dep(βp))}/ ∼c
IndR(x, y) =df
∧
p∈L(R,K)
IndpR(x, y)
Remark 2.3. The use of ∼c in Ind
p
R ensures that Ind
p
R(x, y) is finite. Strictly speaking,
this makes IndpR(x, y) a “conjunction” of equivalence classes of formulas up to con-
textual equivalence. We brush over the difficulty by assuming we in each case choose
a canonical representative for the equivalence class.
Example 2.4. Take L=Arg . Then we have
Inds=A(f, g) = {∀h(f =A h ≃ g =A h), f =A f ≃ g =A f, f =A g ≃ g =A g}
where we have used the standard abbreviation f =A g for the sort =A (f, g). Intu-
itively, IndsA(f, g) expresses the fact that “binary relation” =A should not distinguish
between f and g when they are “plugged in” position s, i.e. in the “source” position,
which we take to be the left-hand side. And “does not distinguish” is in turn un-
derstood as the existence of an equivalence (to be defined below) between the sorts
f =A h and g =A h that we obtain by plugging f and g into the s position, for any
h. Clearly this is something that we would expect of the binary relation of equality,
although of course at this point this is simply uninterpreted syntax.
Definition 2.5 (Ind(x, y), x ∼= y). For x, y : K we define the following formula
Ind(x, y) =df
∧
R∈Lx∩Ly
IndR(x, y)
which we express as x and y are indistinguishable. In the special case when ∂x = ∂y
we write x ∼= y for Ind(x, y) and say that x and y are isomorphic.
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Observe that we have FV(Ind(x, y)) = dep(x) ∪ dep(y). Ind(x, y) captures the
intended meaning that “x and y are indistinguishable up to equivalence by any x-
compatible and y-compatible R, in any position”. Of course, for this definition to
be useful we also need to define equivalence as it appears in IndpR(x, y) (i.e. in the
formula ∀Γα,βR(α) ≃ R(β)), which we do below. But even before we do that, we can
draw some useful conclusions in some degenerate cases.
Example 2.6. In Lrg let f, g : A(x, y). Then Lf = Lg = ∅ which means f ∼= g ≡α ⊤
(as the empty conjunction). This is a strange but I think correct conclusion. For if
two terms cannot be distinguished by any data in the FOLDS signature (i.e. they
have no compatible sorts) then the appropriate saturation condition is to regard them
as always isomorphic.
Example 2.7. A bit stranger is the situation where, say, f : A(x, x) and g : A(x, y),
still in Lrg. In this case, we have Lf 6= ∅, but Lf ∩ Lg = ∅, and so Definition 2.5
dictates that we should regard f and g as always indistinguishable. Formally, this
does not seem to be problematic but it is a little harder to make sense of since there
is certainly something in the syntax that distinguishes f and g, namely that in the
case of the former we have fd = fc but the analogous equation does not hold of g.
Example 2.8. In L=Arg , let f, g : A(x, y). Then Lf = Lg = {=A} and we have
Ind(f, g) = Inds=A(f, g) ∧ Ind
t
=A
(f, g)
= {∀h(f =A h ≃ g =A h), f =A f ≃ g =A f, f =A g ≃ g =A g}∧
{∀h(h =A f ≃ h =A g), f =A f ≃ f =A g, g =A f ≃ g =A g}
Proposition 2.9. For K ∈ obL, l(K) = 1, x, y : K we have Ind(x, y) ≡α ⊤.
Proof. We have Lx = Ly = ∅ hence Ind(x, y) is an empty conjunction and therefore
the same thing as ⊤. 
We now turn our attention to the definition of ≃.
Definition 2.10 (K(α) ≃ K(β)). For K ∈ obL and α, β : K we define the following
formula:
K(α) ≃ K(β) =df
[
∀x : K(α)∃y : K(β).Ind(x, y) ∧ (∀y′ : K(β).Ind(x, y′)→ y ∼= y′)
]
∧[
∀x, x′ : K(α)∀y, y′ : K(β).Ind(x, y) ∧ Ind(x′, y′) ∧ y ∼= y′ → x ∼= x′
]
∧[
∀y : K(β)∃x : K(α).Ind(x, y)
]
When the formula holds we say that K(α) is equivalent to K(β).
To aid understanding, here is the intended meaning behind K(α) ≃ K(β): the
first conjunct expresses that Ind(x, y) is a functional relation (up to ∼=), the second
line expresses that Ind(x, y) is injective (up to ∼=), and the third line express that
Ind(x, y) is surjective. Putting all this together, K(α) ≃ K(β) can be understood as
saying “Ind(x, y) is an equivalence up to ∼=”.
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Note that we have FV(K(α) ≃ K(β)) = ∂α ∩ ∂β. Indeed, since K(α) ≃ K(β)
depends only on the respective boundaries of α and β it is usually helpful to write
K(∂α) ≃ K(∂β) when the variables in the boundary can be explicitly listed. For
example, we can write A(x, y) for the sort of “arrows” in Lrg dependent on x, y : O
instead of the more alienating A(f) (for some f that depends on x and y).
Example 2.11. In Lrg let x, y : O. Then we have:
A(x, x) ≃ A(y, y) =[
∀f : A(x, x)∃g : A(y, y).Ind(f, g) ∧ (∀h : A(y, y).Ind(f, h)→ g ∼= h)
]
∧[
∀f, f ′ : A(x, x)∀g, g′ : A(y, y).Ind(f, g) ∧ Ind(f ′, g′) ∧ g ∼= g′ → f ∼= f ′
]
∧[
∀g : A(y, y)∃f : A(x, x).Ind(f, g)
]
=
[
∀f : A(x, x)∃g : A(y, y).(I(f) ≃ I(g)) ∧ (∀h : A(y, y).(I(f) ≃ I(h))
→ (I(g) ≃ I(h))
]
∧[
∀f, f ′ : A(x, x)∀g, g′ : A(y, y).(I(f) ≃ I(g)) ∧ (I(f ′) ≃ I(g′)) ∧ (I(g) ≃ I(g′))
→ (I(f) ≃ I(f ′))
]
∧[
∀g : A(y, y)∃f : A(x, x).(I(f) ≃ I(g))
]
The only sort that could distinguish two variables f : A(x, x) and g : A(y, y) in Lrg
is I. Therefore, Ind(f, g) becomes (I(f) ≃ I(g)) as prescribed by the definition of
Ind. So what we get, intuitively, is that A(x, x) and A(y, y) are equivalent iff there is
a one-to-one correspondence between “terms” f of A(x, x) and “terms” g of A(y, y)
that give equivalent sorts when plugged into I, i.e. such that I(f) ≃ I(g). Except
this “one-to-one correspondence” is one-to-one only up to ∼= which in the case of Lrg
amounts to the exact same property, namely g ∼= h iff g and h produce equivalent
sorts when plugged into the “type family” I. We clearly here want to regard I as a
predicate (e.g. picking out which “arrows” are “identities”) which would make the
equivalence I(f) ≃ I(g) a logical equivalence. This is what the next proposition
establishes for sorts, like I, of level 1.
Proposition 2.12. For K ∈ obL, l(K) = 1 we have K(α) ≃ K(β)⇔ K(α)↔ K(β)
Proof. Note that Lα = Lβ = ∅ which means that for x, x′ : K(α) and y′, y : K(β) we
have
IndpR(x, y)⇔ Ind
p
R(x
′, y)⇔ IndpR(x, y
′)⇔ x ∼= x′ ⇔ y ∼= y′ ⇔ ⊤
Therefore, by Proposition 2.9, we can see that K(α) ≃ K(β) is logically equivalent
to
∀x : K(α)∃y : K(β).⊤ ∧ ∀y : K(β)∃x : K(α).⊤
which in turn is logically equivalent to K(α)↔ K(β). 
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Using propositions 2.9 and 2.12 we can successively obtain formulas for x ∼= y for
x, y : K for sorts K or arbitrarily high level. We will write ∼=K for the isomorphism
relation defined on a sort K, or ∼=K(α) whenever we want to make the specific context
explicit. We now prove the following crucial result, which is the last general result
we will carry out “formally”, i.e. assuming an arbitrary formal system for FOLDS.
Proposition 2.13. Let L be a FOLDS signature. For any K ∈ obL, Ind(x, y) is an
equivalence relation. That is, it satisfies the following three properties:
(reflInd) ∀x : K.Ind(x, x)
(sym
Ind
) ∀x, y : K.Ind(x, y)⇒ Ind(y, x)
(tranInd) ∀x, y, z : K.Ind(x, y) ∧ Ind(y, z)⇒ Ind(y, z)
In particular, for any K ∈ obL, x ∼= y is an equivalence relation.
.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the level of K.
Base Step: For any sort K with l(K) = 1 the statement follows immediately from
Proposition 2.9.
Inductive Step: For any choices of α, β, γ define the following formulas:
(refl≃) K(α) ≃ K(α)
(symInd) K(α) ≃ K(β)⇒ K(β) ≃ K(α)
(tranInd) K(α) ≃ K(β) ∧K(β) ≃ K(γ)⇒ K(α) ≃ K(γ)
Let us denote the conjunction of the three statements above as (eqrK≃ ) and similarly
let us denote by (eqrKInd) the conjunction of the three sentences in the statement of the
Proposition. Similarly, let us write (eqrnInd) for the statement that for any sort K with
l(K) ≥ n, (eqrKInd) holds and (eqr
n
≃) for the analogous statement for ≃. The proof of
the inductive step now proceeds in two steps. First we prove that (eqrnInd) ⇒ (eqr
n
≃)
and then that (eqrn≃)⇒ (eqr
n+1
Ind ). Put together these give (eqr
n
Ind) ⇒ (eqr
n+1
Ind ) which
is exactly what the inductive step requires us to prove. We take them in turn.
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(eqrnInd)⇒ (eqr
n
≃): For (refl≃) we have:
(refl≃) =df K(α) ≃ K(α)
=df
[
∀x : K(α)∃y : K(α).Ind(x, y) ∧ (∀y′ : K(α).Ind(x, y′)→ y ∼= y′)
]
∧[
∀x, x′ : K(α)∀y, y′ : K(α).Ind(x, y) ∧ Ind(x′, y′) ∧ y ∼= y′ → x ∼= x′
]
∧[
∀y : K(α)∃x : K(α).Ind(x, y)
]
≡α
[
∀x : K(α)∃y : K(α).x ∼= y ∧ (∀y′ : K(α).x ∼= y′ → y ∼= y′)
]
∧[
∀x, x′ : K(α)∀y, y′ : K(α).x ∼= y ∧ x′ ∼= y′ ∧ y ∼= y′ → x ∼= x′
]
∧[
∀y : K(α)∃x : K(α).x ∼= y
]
The last form is obtained because when x, y are of the same sort we write x ∼= y instead
of Ind(x, y). The first conjunct ∀x : K(α)∃y : K(α).x ∼= y ∧ (∀y′ : K(α).x ∼= y′ → y ∼=
y′) follows from the reflexivity of ∼=, which is given by the inductive hypothesis. The
second conjunct ∀x, x′ : K(α)∀y, y′ : K(α).x ∼= y ∧ x′ ∼= y′ ∧ y ∼= y′ → x ∼= x′ follows
from the symmetry and transitivity of ∼=, which is once again given by the inductive
hypothesis. Finally, the third conjunct ∀y : K(α)∃x : K(α).x ∼= y follows from the
reflexivity of ∼= which is once again given by the inductive hypothesis. For (sym≃)
we have:
(sym≃) =df K(α) ≃ K(β)⇒ K(β) ≃ K(α)
=df
[
∀x : K(α)∃y : K(β).(Ind(x, y) ∧ (∀y′ : K(β).Ind(x, y′)→ y ∼= y′))∧
∀x, x′ : K(α)∀y, y′ : K(β).Ind(x, y) ∧ Ind(x′, y′) ∧ y ∼= y′ → x ∼= x′∧
∀y : K(β)∃x : K(α).Ind(x, y)
]
⇒
[
∀x : K(β)∃y : K(α).Ind(x, y) ∧ (∀y′ : K(α).Ind(x, y′)→ y ∼= y′)∧
∀x, x′ : K(β)∀y, y′ : K(α).Ind(x, y) ∧ Ind(x′, y′) ∧ y ∼= y′ → x ∼= x′∧
∀y : K(α)∃x : K(β).Ind(x, y)
]
By the inductive hypothesis, we can assume that Ind is symmetric, which means
that if Ind(x, y) defines an “equivalence up to ∼=” then Ind(y, x) also defines such an
equivalence. We can use this basic idea to deduce each of the conjuncts of the RHS
from the LHS. We deduce the conjunct ∀y : K(α)∃x : K(β).Ind(x, y) on the RHS as
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an illustration. We have:
K(α) ≃ K(β)⇒ ∀y : K(β)∃x : K(α).Ind(x, y)
⇒ ∀y : K(β)∃x : K(α).Ind(y, x)(sym)
≡α ∀x : K(β)∃y : K(α).Ind(x, y)
By an exactly analogous argument we can establish (tran≃).
(eqrnInd)⇒ (eqr
n+1
Ind ): Let K be a sort with l(K) = n+1. Firstly, note that it suffices
to establish (eqrIndp
R
) for any R > K and p : R → K since Ind is a conjunction over
all such R and p. Thus, the properties to be shown are the following:
(reflIndp
R
) ∀x : K.IndpR(x, x)
(symIndp
R
) ∀x, y : K.IndpR(x, y)⇒ Ind
p
R(y, x)
(tranIndp
R
) ∀x, y, z : K.IndpR(x, y) ∧ Ind
p
R(y, z)⇒ Ind
p
R(y, z)
We take each of the three statements to be shown in turn. Firstly, for (reflIndp
R
) we
have:
IndpR(x, x) =df
∧
{∀Γα,βR(α) ≃ R(β) | α, β : R,αp = x, βp = x, ∀q 6= p(αq = βq)}/ ∼c
=
∧
{∀Γα,αR(α) ≃ R(α) | α : R,αp = x}/ ∼c
where the equality follows since α and β in the general definition of IndpR(x, y) are
stipulated to differ only in the variable they assign to position p, which is here going
to be the same variable. We therefore get that IndpR(x, x) holds iff R(α) ≃ R(α)
holds, and we know that the latter is the case from the inductive hypothesis together
with the first part of the inductive step above, since R > K.
Secondly, for (symIndp
R
) we have:
IndpR(x, y) =df
∧
{∀Γα,βR(α) ≃ R(β) | α, β : R,αp = x, βp = y, ∀p 6= q(αq = βq)}/ ∼c
⇒
∧
{∀Γα,βR(β) ≃ R(α) | α, β : R,αp = x, βp = y, ∀p 6= q(αq = βq)}/ ∼c(sym≃)
≡α
∧
{∀Γα,βR(β) ≃ R(α) | β, α : R, βp = x, αp = y, ∀p 6= q(αq = βq)}/ ∼c
=df Ind
p
R(y, x)
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Thirdly, for (tranIndp
R
) we have:
IndpR(x, y) ∧ Ind
p
R(y, z)
=df
∧
{∀Γα,βR(α) ≃ R(β) | α, β : R,αp = x, βp = y, ∀p 6= q(αq = βq)}/ ∼c
∧
∧
{∀Γα,βR(α) ≃ R(β) | α, β : R,αp = y, βp = z, ∀p 6= q(αq = βq)}/ ∼c
⇔
∧
{∀Γα,β ∪ Γβ,γR(α) ≃ R(β) ∧R(β) ≃ R(γ) | αp = x, βp = y, γp = z}/ ∼c
⇒
∧
{∀Γα,γR(α) ≃ R(γ) | αp = x, γp = z)}/ ∼c
=df Ind
p
R(x, z)
This establishes the fact that Ind(x, y) is an equivalence relation, thus completing the
inductive step. 
We conclude this section by comparing our syntactic definitions to the usual no-
tions. In Lcat, for x, y : O let Iso(x, y) denote the formula expressing that x and y
are isomorphic in the traditional sense (“There exist mutually inverse f : A(x, y) and
g : A(y, x)”) Call this notion categorical isomorphism. The following proposition days
that in Tcat the two notions of isomorphism are logically equivalent.
Proposition 2.14. Tcat |= Iso(x, y)⇔ x ∼= y
Proof. Firstly, note that by the axioms for equality on A we will get that for any
f, f ′ : A(x, y)
Tcat |= f ∼=A f
′ ⇔ f =A f
′
This allows us to replace (up to logical equivalence) the =A as it appears in Iso(x, y)
with our notion of ∼=A. We will assume we have done so. The (⇒) direction follows
from the well-known result (proven e.g. in [Mak95]) that two categorically isomor-
phic objects in a category satisfy exactly the same Lcat-formulas, and are therefore
indistinguishable in exactly the sense of x ∼= y. For the (⇐) direction, note that from
the Yoneda Lemma we know that x and y are categorically isomorphic if and only if
their images under the Yoneda embedding are isomorphic, i.e. if we have a natural
isomorphism from y(−, x) to y(−, y). The existence of such a natural isomorphism
can be expressed as the following Lcat-formula
Yso(x, y) =df ∀z, w : O∀f : A(w, z)∀g : A(z, x)∀h : A(w, x)∀k : A(w, y)∀l : A(z, y)
A(z, x) ≃ A(z, y) ∧ (◦(g, f, h) ∧ Ind(h, k)↔ Ind(g, l) ∧ ◦(l, f, k)))
By the Yoneda Lemma we have Tcat |= ∀x∀yIso(x, y) ⇔ Yso(x, y). But Yso(x, y) is
clearly a consequence of x ∼= y since both conjuncts appear in the definitions given
above if, using Proposition 2.12, we regard ↔ as an instance of ≃. We thus get
x ∼= y ⇒ Iso(x, y) 
Remark 2.15. An important difference with our general notion ∼= and the usual no-
tions of isomorphim is that x ∼= y is not necessarily “witnessed” by some other
variable, e.g. an arrow f as in Iso(x, y). Thus, at this level, it is not possible to define
a set of isomorphisms x ∼= y, but rather only a proposition expressing whether or not
x and y are isomorphic. To overcome this limitation, in Section 3 we will interpret
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the existential quantifiers as untruncated Σ-types, which will recover in the semantics
the intuitively correct h-level.
3. Saturation in Type Theory
We now interpret our syntactic definition of isomorphism in type theory. However,
in order to interpret x ∼= y as defined in Section 2 we make one crucial change to
the usual interpretation, which is that we will not truncate the existential quantifiers
that appear in the definition of ≃ in Definition 2.10 and interpret them instead as
full Σ-types. This is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 (Interpretation of ∼= in type theory). Let L be a FOLDS signature
and M an L-structure. For K ∈ obL and α, β : KM we define the following type (in
context (∂α ∪ ∂β)M):
K(α) ≃M K(β) =df
[
Π
x : KM(α)
Σ
y : KM(β)
IndM(x, y)×
(
Π
y′ : KM(β)
IndM(x, y′)→ y ∼=M y′
)]
×
[
Π
x,x′ : KM(α)
y,y′ : KM(β)
(
IndM(x, y)× IndM(x′, y′)× y ∼=M y′ → x ∼=M x′
)]
×
[
Π
y : K(β)
Σ
x : KM(α)
IndM(x, y)
]
By mutual induction we also define for x, y : KM the following type (in context
(dep(x) ∪ dep(y))M):
IndM(x, y) =df ×
R∈Lx∩Ly
p∈L(R,K)
{ Π
z : ΓM
α,β
R(α) ≃M R(β) | αp = x, βp = y, ∀q 6= p(αq = βq)}/ ∼c
Whenever x, y : KM are such that ∂x = ∂y we write x ∼=M y for IndM(x, y). Thus,
given any FOLDS signature L, any K ∈ obL we obtain a relation (in an appropriate
context):
∼=KM : K
M ×KM → U
Notation. Whenever the sort of x and y is understood we will usually denote the
type ∼=KM (x, y) as simply x ∼= y.
LetM be an L-structure and K any sort in L, with KM its interpretation. Propo-
sition 2.13 holds also in type theory (since the proof was purely formal) and so the
relation ∼=KM will be reflexive. In particular, this means that given any context Γ
appropriate to K we have
ΓM, x : KM ⊢ ρx : x ∼= x
where ρx is some term witnessing the reflexivity. This gives us a canonical map
ΓM, x, y : KM ⊢ idtoisox,y : x = y → x ∼= y
by the usual induction on identity.
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Definition 3.2 (Saturation). Let L be a FOLDS signature, K ∈ obL, Γ a context
appropriate to K and M an L-structure. Then the saturation for KM is the
following proposition (in context ΓM):
Sat(KM) =df Π
x,y : KM
isequiv(idtoisox,y)
For an L-structure M, we say that K is saturated (or that M is K-saturated)
if Sat(KM) is inhabited. We will say that an L-structure is saturated at level n
(or n-saturated) if it is K-saturated for any K ∈ obL with l(K) ≤ n. We will also
say that an L-structureM is totally saturated if it is saturated at every level. We
write SatStrL (resp. SatStr
n
L) for the type of totally saturated (resp. n-saturated)
L-structures and SatMod
T
(resp. SatModn
T
) for the type of totally saturated (resp.
n-saturated) T-models (for some L-theory T).
Based on Definition 3.2 we regard StrucL (resp. ModT) as the type of “totally
unsaturated” types of L-structures (resp. models of T). The following example
illustrates the idea.
Example 3.3.
StrucLrg =df Σ
O : U
A : O×O→U
(
Π
x : A
A(x, x)→ U
)
SatStruc1Lrg ≃ ΣO : U
A : O×O→U
Π
x : A
(
A(x, x)→ PropU
)
It is important to note the difference between =df and ≃ above. The RHS in the first
line is the definition of StrucLrg whereas the RHS of the second line is a consequence
of Proposition 2.9.
The most relevant notion for practical purposes is saturation at a particular level
(or total saturation). This is because K-saturation for an individual K may be of
very little use unless we know that everything that depends onK is already saturated.
For example, it is not of much use to state the saturation condition for objects in a
precategory unless we already know that the hom-sets are h-sets. On the contrary, if
we know that L is saturated at level n and K is a sort of level n, then K-saturation
means that isomorphism in K is expressed in terms of the identity types of sorts of
lower level, since these have already been declared equivalent to isomorphism. This
has the consequence that saturation at a particular level correlates very well with
h-levels as the following proposition establishes.
Proposition 3.4. Let L be a FOLDS signature and M an L-structure saturated at
level n. Then for any K ∈ obL with l(K) = n, KM is of h-level n.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the level of K. For the case l(K) = 1 note that
M is 1-saturated if and only if for any sort K of level 1, the map
idtoisox,y : x =KM y → (x ∼= y)
M
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is an equivalence. But by Proposition 2.9 we have (x ∼=M y) ≡α ⊤ and hence
idtoisox,y is the unique map into 1. Therefore, we have
Sat(KM) ≃ Π
x,y : KM
x =KM y
and the RHS is equivalent to isprop(KM). Therefore, K is saturated in M if and
only if KM is of h-level 1. Now assume that the proposition holds for n and let K be
a sort of level n + 1 and M an L-structure saturated at level n + 1. Saturation for
K asserts the equivalence between the identity type on K with x ∼=K y. But x ∼= y,
as a type dependent on KM, consists of the following (non-dependent) product:
×
R∈Lx∩Ly
×
p : R→K
(IndpR(x, y))
M
But IndpR is itself a non-dependent product of Π-types of the form
Π
α,β
[
(R(α) ≃M R(β)
]
Since RM(β) and RM(α) are of h-level n by the inductive hypothesis, then by the
explicit form of R(α) ≃M R(β) (cf. Definition 3.1) we also get that R(α) ≃M R(β)
is of h-level n. Since (dependent or non-dependent) products preserve h-level we get
that (x ∼= y)M is of h-level n. Thus, if KM is saturated, its identity types will be of
h-level n, and thus KM will itself be of h-level n+ 1, as required. 
The following lemma is also an easy consequence of our definitions. It makes precise
in what way the syntactically defined notion of equivalence becomes a “functional”
notion in the semantics, as long as everything “above” has been saturated.
Lemma 3.5. Let L be a FOLDS signature and M an L-structure saturated at level
n. Then for any K ∈ obL with l(K) = n we have:[
K(α) ≃M K(β)
]
≃ Σ
f : KM(α)→KM(β)
bij(f)× Π
x : KM(α)
IndM(x, f(x))
Proof. By inspecting the definition of we can see that the first type in K(α) ≃M
K(β) is equivalent to the type of functions KM(α)→ KM(β), since ∼=M can simply
be replaced by =KM since we are assuming M is n-saturated. And the last two
types state exactly that this function is injective and (split) surjective, and hence
bijective. 
Remark 3.6. Saturation as defined by Definition 3.2 relies essentially on the type-
theoretic semantics of FOLDS. This means that saturated models of T are defined
“semantically” since we have not provided a way of expressing the condition of sat-
uration in the syntax of FOLDS. One might therefore wonder if there is a way to
define saturation in an entirely syntactic manner in FOLDS, and then obtain the
usual saturated notions by interpreting that definition. This can indeed be done as
long as we syntactically define “transport bijections” that for each “inhabitant” of
x ∼=K y yield an “equivalence” between A(x,w) and A(y,w) for any A dependent on
K. We do this in full generality in [Tse] for the purposes of a completeness proof, but
this machinery is somewhat independent of the purposes of this paper.
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4. A Higher Structure Identity Principle
A Structure Identity Principle in the sense of [Uni13] asserts something along the
lines of: “Isomorphism between structures of a certain kind is equivalent to identity.”
In [Uni13] such a statement was proven for set-level structures, i.e. for first-order
structures in the traditional sense. Here we prove a generalized Structure Identity
Principle where by “structure” we will understand saturated L-structures for (finite)
FOLDS signatures L of height 3 and by “isomorphic” we will understand the pre-
existing notion of FOLDS equivalence, suitably internalized in type theory.
Let us first define FOLDS equivalence. Fix an L and let us for the time being
work “extrenally” i.e. in a traditional set-theoretic set-up, writing M,N, . . . instead
of M,N , . . . to distinguish the two notions of L-structure. An L-structure is a
functorM : L → Set and a homomorphism of L-structures is a natural transformation
between the corresponding functors. Write y for the Yoneda embedding and yˆ for
subfunctor of y that misses the identity on the given object. For K ∈ obL a K-
boundary of an L-structure M is a natural transformation δ : yˆK ⇒ M and we define
the fiber of M(K) over δ as the set M(K)[δ] = {a ∈ M(K) : ∂a = δ}. Now let
M,N be L-structures and let f : M → N be an L-structure homomorphism and let
δ be a K-boundary of M . This induces a K-boundary f ◦ δ of N by composition
with f and thereby induces a map fδ on the fibers that takes a 7→ fK(a). (The
fact that this is well-defined follows from the naturality of f .) We now say that f
is fiberwise surjective if and only if for all K in L and all K-boundaries δ the map
mδ : M(K)[δ]→M(K)[m ◦ δ] is surjective.
Definition 4.1 ([Mak95]). We say that M and N are FOLDS L-equivalent if there
exists an L-structure P and fiberwise surjective homomorphisms m : P → M and
n : P → N .
We now internalize this definition in type theory. To even write it down, however,
we will now restrict ourselves to signatures L of height 3 and we will assume that
StrL is given by the Σ-type where the relations in L have been “written in”. To be
more precise, we will adopt the following notational conventions. For the rest of the
paper L is a FOLDS signature of height 3.
Notation. We denote the objects in L of level 3 by O = O1, . . . , On, those of level
2 by A = A1, . . . Am and those of level 1 by R = R1, . . . , Rk. We will abbreviate
a sequence of variable declarations x1 : O1, . . . , xn : On as x : O, leaving the indexing
implicit. Similarly, we will abbreviate a product A1 → B1×· · ·×An → Bn as A→ B.
In general, whenever there is any boldface character in our definitions below, this will
mean that the definition is taken over the whole (non-dependent) product that the
implicit indexing suggests. For example, an expression of the form Π
x : O
T (mO(x)) is
an abbreviation for
Π
x1 : O1,...xn : On
[
T (mO1(x1, . . . , xn))× · · · × T (mOn(x1, . . . , xn))
]
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Definition 4.2 (L-homomorphism). Let M and N be L-structures. The type of
L-homomorphisms between M and N is defined as
HomL(M,N ) =df Σ
mO : O
M→ON
mA : Π
x : OM
AM(x)→AN (mO(x))
Π
x : OM
y : AM(y)
RM(y)→ RN (mO(x)(y))
As suggested by the notation above, for any m : HomL(M,N ) and K ∈ obL we
will write mK(x) for the component of m corresponding to sort K in some choice of
variables x.
Definition 4.3 (Split Surjective Map). Let f : A → B be any map. Then f is a
split surjection if the following type is inhabited
sps(f) =df Π
y : B
Σ
x : A
f(x) = y
Remark 4.4. The type sps(f) is not a proposition, and this is necessary. We must
therefore think of sps(f) as the type of splittings of f and there could be many
distinct such splittings.
Definition 4.5. Let m : HomL(M,N ). We define
fibsurj(m) =df sps(mO)× Π
x : O
sps(mA(x))× Π
x : O
y : A(x)
sps(mR(x,y))
We define the type of fiberwise surjective maps from M to N as
FibSurj(M,N ) =df Σ
m : HomL(M,N )
fibsurj(m)
We call a term m : FibSurj(M,N ) a fiberwise surjection.
Remark 4.6. Once again, we need to make clear here that FibSurj(M,N ) is not a
Σ-type comprised of an L-homomorphism that satisfies a property, since fibsurj(f)
will not in general be a proposition. One must rather think of fiberwise surjective
maps as L-homomrphisms together with a choice of a splitting that witnesses the fact
that it is surjective.
Notation. As usual we will abuse notation and treat m : FibSurj(M,N ) as if it
were comprised purely of its “functional” part. We will thus describe the action of m
on terms ofM simply by appendingm to the given terms, suppressing subscripts. For
example, we will write mx for the result of applying mO to some x : O
M and similarly
we will write mf for the result of applying mA(x) to some f : A
M(x). When it is
required to make the particular splitting with which some m : FibSurj(M,N ) comes
equipped we will refer to it by s and describe its action in the same abbreviated
manner as we do with m.
Definition 4.7 (Type-Theoretic FOLDS Equivalence). For any FOLDS signature L
(of height 3) and any M,N : StrL we define
M≃L N =df Σ
P : StrL
FibSurj(P,M)× FibSurj(P,N )
Exactly analogously we define≃L onModT, SatStrL and SatModT for any L-theory
T.
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Definition 4.7 thus gives us a relation ≃L : SatModT × SatModT → U . All the
components are now in place for us to prove our higher structure identity principle.
To do so, we first require the following lemma.
Lemma 4.8. Let L be a FOLDS signature with h(L) = 3, M and N be saturated
L-structures, and m : FibSurj(M,N ) a fiberwise surjective L-homomorphism.
(1) For any f : A(x), g : A(y) we have IndN (mf,mg)↔ IndM(f, g). In particular,
we have mf ∼= mg ↔ f ∼= g.
(2) For any x, y : O we have (mx ∼=M my) ≃ (x ∼=N y).
Proof. For (1) we have that IndM(f, g) will be of the following form
Π
x : OM
RM(x, f)↔ RM(y, g)
and similarly IndN (mf,mg) will be of the following form
Π
x : ON
RN (x, mf)↔ RN (y, mg)
Since each R in the above types will be propositions so will the whole of IndM(f, g)
and IndN (f, g). Therefore, it suffices to prove that they are logically equivalent. To
that end define the maps
( Π
x : OM
RM(x, f)↔ RM(y, g))
σ
// ( Π
x : ON
RN (x, mf)↔ RN (y, mg))
η ✤ // λx.(λr.m(p1(ηs(x)))(sr), λr.m(p2(ηs(x)))(sr))
and
( Π
x : OM
RM(x, f)↔ RM(y, g)) ( Π
x : ON
RN (x, mf)↔ RN (y, mg))
τ
oo
λx.(λr.s(p1(ǫx)(mr)), λr.s(p2(ǫx)(mr))) ǫ
✤oo
The fact that mf ∼= mg ↔ f ∼= g follows by as the special case when x = y.
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For (2), we define maps as shown:
x ∼= y
e
00 mx ∼= my
d
qq
Π
z : OM
AM(x, z) ≃ AM(y, z)
e
// Π
z : ON
AN (mx, z) ≃ AN (my, z)
d
pp
Π
z : OM
f : AM(x,z)
Σ
g : AM(y,z)
IndM(f, g)
e
// Π
z : ON
f : AN (mx,z)
Σ
g : AN (my,z)
IndN (mf,mg)
d
pp
η ✤ // λzλf.
〈
m(p1(ηsz,sf)), σ(p2(ηsz,sf))
〉
λzλf.
〈
s(p1(ǫmz,mf )), τ(p2(ǫmz,mf ))
〉
ǫ✤oo
It is easy to check that d and e are inverses to each other, thus establishing the
required equivalence. 
We are now ready to state and prove the main result of this paper which is a fully
precise version of the guiding Pre-Theorem 0.2 in the Introduction.
Theorem 4.9 (Higher Structure Identity Principle). For any L with h(L) = 3, any
L-theory T and for any saturated T-models M and N of an L-theory T we have
(M≃L N ) ≃ (M =SatMod
T
N )
Proof. Let M and N be saturated models for some L-theory T. Clearly, it suffices
to prove that FibSurj(M,N ) ≃M =SatMod
T
N . We define a map
k : FibSurj(M,N )→M =SatMod
T
N
Let m : FibSurj(M,N ). By univalence, to produce a term of type M =SatMod
T
N
it suffices to produce component-wise equivalences for all the defining data ofM and
N . Since m is assumed fiberwise surjective we know that it provides component-wise
surjections between the defining data of M and N . Thus, it suffices to prove that m
is also component-wise an injection. We do so by taking the data of L level-by-level,
abusing notation by ignoring the necessary transfers.
SinceM and N are saturated, by Proposition 3.4 each RM(x) and RN (y) will be
of h-level 1. Therefore, all the
mR(x) : R
M(x)→ RN (y)
are trivially also injections, and therefore equivalences.
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Now consider mA(x) : A
M(x)→ AN (mx). By Proposition 3.4 once again we know
thatmA(x) is a map of h-sets and therefore to show that it is an equivalence it suffices
to show mA(x)(α) = mA(x)(β)→ α = β. But then note that we have the following
composite map
mA(x)(α) = mA(x)(β)
(1)
−→ mA(x)(α) ∼= mA(x)(β)
(2)
−→ α ∼= β
(3)
−→ α = β
where (1) is by induction on identity, (2) is by the first part of Lemma 4.8 since m is
assumed fiberwise surjective and (3) is because M is assumed saturated.
Finally, for mO : O
M → ON , to show that it is injective it suffices to show that
there is an equivalence (x = y) ≃ (mx = my) for any x, y : O. Since both M and N
are saturated this is equivalent to showing that (x ∼= y) ≃ (mx ∼= my). But since m
is fiberwise surjective, this follows from the second part of Lemma 4.8.
This completes the definition of the map k. Now we need to show that k is itself an
equivalence. To see this note that by univalence any p : M =SatMod
T
N gives rise to
a fiberwise surjective homomorphism mp with components given by the equivalences
that p induces. This gives a map
l : M =SatMod
T
N → FibSurj(M,N )
which can easily be seen to be a two-sided inverse for k. Thus, k is an equivalence,
and this completes the proof. 
In order to test the adequacy of our Structure Identity Principle we need to show
that it specializes to familiar cases. In this case, we need to show that Theorem 9.4.16
of [Uni13] follows as a special case of our Theorem 4.9. The next series of Propositions
and Lemmas aim exactly at demonstrating this.
Proposition 4.10. The type SatMod2
Tcat
of 2-saturated models of the Lcat-theory of
categories is equivalent to the type PreCat of precategories.
Proof. By the axioms for =A in the theory of categories we can obtain that
Tcat |= ∀x, y : O∀f, g : A(x, y).f ∼= g ↔ f =A g
So if C is any 2-saturated Tcat-model we will have
Π
x,y : OC
Π
f,g : AC(x,y)
(f =A g)
C ↔ f =AC(x,y) g
And since (f =A g)
C will be of h-level 1 (by Proposition 3.4) this means exactly
that AC(x, y) is a set for all x, y : OC. What remains to be shown is that the (inter-
pretations of) the axioms of Tcat correspond exactly to the axioms for precategories
(but in relational form). This is straightforward and already established in [Tse16] as
Proposition 7.1 and has even been formalized in [VAG+]. 
Lemma 4.11. Let C be a precategory. For every x, y, z : OC, α : AC(z, x)→ AC(z, y)
and h : AC(z, x) we have
IndC(h, α(h)) ≃ Π
w : OC
g : AC(w,z)
α(h) ◦ g = α(h ◦ g)
22 DIMITRIS TSEMENTZIS
Proof. Since both types are propositions (since we assume that C is a precategory,
and therefore identity in any hom-set will be a proposition) it suffices to show that
they are logically equivalent.
For
IndC(h, α(h))→ Π
w : OC
g : AC(w,z)
α(h) ◦ g = α(h ◦ g)
note that by the definition of Ind, IndC(h, α(h)) will contain the following proposition
among the cartesian product that defines it:
Π
w : O
g : A(w,z)
(
α(h) ◦ g = α(h ◦ g)↔ h ◦ g = h ◦ g
)
Since the RHS is trivially inhabited, the above type logically entails
Π
w : OC
g : AC(w,z)
α(h) ◦ g = α(h ◦ g)
as required.
In the other direction, the only non trivial biconditional in IndC(h, α(h)) given the
data will be
Π
w,w′ : OC
g : AC(w,z)
k : AC(x,w′)
(
g ◦ h = k ↔ g ◦ α(h) = α(k)
)
But this follows immediately from
Π
w : OC
g : AC(w,z)
α(h) ◦ g = α(h ◦ g)
as required. 
Lemma 4.12. Let C be a precategory. For every x, y : OC we have
Π
z : OC
A(z, x) ≃C A(z, y)
Proof. By Lemma 3.5 we know that A(z, x) ≃C A(z, y) is equivalent to the type of bi-
jections from AC(z, x) to AC(z, y). Since each C is a precategory, AC(z, x) and AC(z, y)
are sets, and therefore bijections are equivalences, which means that A(z, x) ≃C
A(z, y) is the type of (semantic) equivalences AC(z, x) ≃ AC(z, y). Exactly the same
reasoning applies to A(x, z) ≃C A(y, z), A(x, x) ≃C A(x, y), A(x, x) ≃C A(y, y) and
A(x, y) ≃C A(y, y) which are the rest of the conjuncts of x ∼= y if we follow Definition
3.1. Thus, to prove the Lemma it suffices to show[
Π
z : OC
AC(z, x) ≃ AC(z, y)
]
≃
[
Π
z : OC
(
AC(z, x) ≃ AC(z, y)
)
×
(
AC(x, z) ≃ AC(y, z)
)]
which follows from the elementary result in category theory that precomposition by
an arrow induces a bijection on every hom-set iff postcomposition also does. 
Proposition 4.13. The type SatMod
Tcat
of totally saturated models of the Lcat-
theory of categories is equivalent to the type UniCat of univalent categories.
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Proof. By Proposition 4.10 it suffices to show that for any precategory C and any
x, y : OC we have IsoC(x, y) ≃ x ∼= y. To see this observe the following series of
equivalences:
IsoC(x, y)
By Definition
Σ
f : AC(x,y)
isiso(f)
≃By Yoneda Lemma

Π
z : OC
Σ
α : AC(z,x)→AC(z,y)
bij(α)× Π
w : OC
h : AC(z,x)
g : AC(w,z)
α(h) ◦ g = α(h ◦ g)
≃By Lemma 4.11

Π
z : OC
Σ
α : AC(z,x)→AC(z,y)
bij(α)× Π
h : AC(z,x)
IndC(h, α(h))
≃By Lemma 3.5

Π
z : OC
[[
Π
f : A(z,x)
Σ
g : A(z,y)
Ind(f, g)× Π
h : A(z,y)
Ind(f, h)→ h = g
]
×
[
Π
f,f ′ : AC(z,x)
g,g′ : AC(z,y)
IndC(f, g)× IndC(f ′, g′)× g = g′ → f = f ′)
]
×
[
Π
g : AC(z,x)
Σ
f : AC(z,y)
IndC(f, g)
]]
Π
z : OC
A(z, x) ≃C A(z, y)
≃By Lemma 4.12

x ∼= y

Corollary 4.14 ([Uni13], Theorem 9.4.16). For any univalent categories C and D,
the type of categorical equivalences C ≃cat D is equivalent to C =UniCat D.
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Proof. By Theorem 4.9 what remains now is to show that in UniCat, the relation
≃Lcat is equivalent to categorical equivalence as defined in [Uni13]. But this is imme-
diate by inspection. 
Remark 4.15. Propositions 4.10 and 4.13 in our opinion provide the correct taxonomy
of category theory in the Univalent Foundations. In particular, we should regard pre-
categories not as “unsaturated” categories but rather as the 2-saturated Tcat-models.
This leaves two more “category theories” that currently have no name: the “totally
unsaturated” models ModTcat and the 1-saturated models SatMod
1
Tcat
. There are
thus four different category theories in the Univalent Foundations with respect to
saturation as we have defined it. They can be thought of as follows, with the obvious
inclusions:
UniCat →֒ PreCat →֒ SatMod1
Tcat
→֒ModTcat
We believe this is the right point of view to take with respect to category theory (and
other theories) in the Univalent Foundations.
Remark 4.16. As the series of inclusions above suggests, clearly one can now ask
to what extent we can have “Rezk completion”-type operations that reverse (in ap-
propriate ways) the above inclusions. This is clearly an avenue worth pursuing fur-
ther. In particular, the following question seems to us of immediate interest: Given
an L-theory T, for which n ≥ h(L) can we construct an adjoint to the inclusion
SatModn
Tcat
→֒ SatModn−1
Tcat
? Answers to this question seem to us unlikely to be
pursued at least initially for any L with h(L) > 3.
Finally, let us mention that in principle there is no obstacle to extending the proof
of Theorem 4.9 to signatures L of arbitrarily large finite height. There are however
two main difficulties. Firstly, finding a sufficiently practical way of packaging the
syntax of such an L so as to define the relevant notions of L-homomorphism, L-
equivalence etc. Secondly, proving the higher analogues of Lemma 4.8 which would
require establishing equivalences between n-types of ever larger n. Solving these
difficulties seems not entirely out of reach. Proving a version of Theorem 4.9 for all
n > 1 therefore seems to us an interesting open problem.
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